We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may differ in the liquidity they provide. Moreover, traders have idiosyncratic preferences for the markets, e.g. due to differential time preferences for maturity dates of futures contracts. For a broad range of parameters we find that no trade, trade on both markets (individualization) as well as trade on one market only (standardization) is supported by a Nash equilibrium. By contrast whenever the number of traders becomes large the evolutionary process selects a unique stochastically stable state which corresponds to the equilibrium with two active markets and coincides with the welfare maximizing market structure.
Introduction
In standard general equilibrium models without trading frictions, all agents can simultaneously act on all existing market places. In reality, however, it can commonly be observed that agents need to make choices about particular markets they participate in. In the context of financial markets, prominent examples for this kind of decision problem are the choice of an exchange by a broker or by a company issuing shares.
To analyze the implications of such a situation, this paper studies a simple model with two markets located at the endpoints of an interval, where identical assets can be traded. These markets may differ in two respects. Firstly, all traders perceive a market to be more attractive if the number of traders trading on this market increases. In line with the literature 1 this size effect is due to liquidity considerations in the sense that a larger set of traders guarantees better predictable price realizations for the assets. Secondly, each trader has an individual preference for one of the two markets. We model this preference by a simple linear cost schedule and assume that traders are sitting at equal distance from each other between the two markets. Hence, agents face a trade-off in this model between the expected liquidity of a market and its characteristics with respect to idiosyncratic preferences. The cost can be given several interpretations, e.g. it may reflect traders' time preference when the interval represents all possible maturity dates of futures contracts (see Economides and Siow (1988) ). Or the cost may reflect a trader's preference or cost of adaption for different information systems or trading platforms used by the exchanges. The recent attempts of stock exchanges in Europe to merge have shown that a unification of trading and information platforms is at the heart of the merger. When preferences for the information systems are too diverse and are not compensated by a positive size effect the merger is likely to fail as it was the case for the London and Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
As a benchmark case we first study the situation where agents correctly anticipate the expected liquidity on the two markets. It turns out that a (static) pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists but that there may be multiple equilibria 1 See for example O'Hara (1995).
1 including an implausible no trade equilibrium. In particular, there are ranges of the parameter values for this model where both the situation where all traders meet on one of the two markets and the situation where each market is actively used coexist as Nash equilibria. This coexistence of equilibria is robust against an increase in the number of traders, which is a very counterintuitive result.
In a second step the paper addresses the question if an evolutionary process will select one of these equilibria and if so what are the welfare properties of the selected equilibrium. To this end we study a dynamic sequence of the static economies. In each period, agents play a best reply to a sample of observations made in the past concerning the liquidity of the two markets. In choosing a best reply agents occasionally make a mistake. Hence, the evolutionary model is driven by the "adaptive-play-dynamic" introduced by Young (1993) . Applying the general method of Young (1993) we determine the stochastically stable states in which the evolutionary process will spend most of its time as the error rate goes to zero. We find that there are two critical values for the exogenous costs, such that for costs below the lower value, all agents meet on a single market The evolutionary approach predicts that only the situation with two markets will survive in the long run if the number of traders approaches infinity. This, as we will see, is also the welfare maximizing market structure.
The model analyzed in this paper relates to several strands of the literature.
It builds on the literature on the selection of markets in the presence of liquidity effects in static economies. Important contributions in this field are due to Pagano (1989a Pagano ( , 1989b , and to Economides and Siow (1988) . The latter paper studies a similar model to ours in a static framework where multiple equilibria with ambiguous welfare properties arise as well. Our paper goes a step further by analyzing the stability properties of the different equilibria. Similar models are also studied in the theory of political economy, where, for example, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) investigate the endogenous determination of the number and size of nations. The model presented in this paper extends this strand of the literature by studying the issue of market selection within an evolutionary framework.
Moreover, our paper adds to the recent literature on endogenous participation in financial markets (see Bettzüge and Hens (2001) and Güth and Ludwig (2000) ).
While we study the evolution of market participation in general, i.e. the choice between different asset markets, Bettzüge and Hens (2001) and Güth and Ludwig (2000) concentrate on the evolution of single assets, their emergence and development, on one asset market. Hence our results complement theirs and there are interesting parallels: Bettzüge and Hens (2001) find that incomplete financial markets can be a persistent phenomenon. In Güth and Ludwig (2000) it is shown that there exist stable situations where traders, who are restricted in the number of assets they can trade, do not necessarily exhaust these trading restrictions.
And our results show that the existence of two markets is not necessarily a stable situation if the number of traders is small.
Apparently our model and the forces between standardization and individualization we study also relate to economic geography and questions of the emergence and spatial distribution of industries and cities that are analyzed there. In a seminal paper Krugman (1991) studies a core-periphery model with two regions and with industrial firms having an increasing returns to scale technology but facing a cost for delivering their good to the other region of the economy. Hence there is a trade-off between economies of scale and costs. However, the workers do not perceive this trade-off as in our model but rather it is assumed that they move towards higher real wages. Krugman analyzes the steady states of the resulting dynamics which is in the spirit of the replicator dynamics frequently used in evolutionary game theory. Similar to our result he finds that for low costs only the agglomeration with all firms concentrating in one region is stable, while for high costs only the symmetric equilibrium with manufacturing equally split between the two regions is stable. Finally, our model can be seen as a specific instance of the large and growing literature on evolutionary equilibrium and disequilibrium selection.
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While 2 For an overview see Samuelson (1997) and Young (1998) .
3 having some severe limitations with respect to the robustness of its predictions 3 the concept of a best-reply dynamic and of stochastically stable equilibria is one of the most prominent approaches suggested within evolutionary game theory.
Our paper exemplifies the power of this approach for the specific game we are studying.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the static model and derive the Nash equilibria. In section 3 we present the evolutionary approach and solve for the stochastic stable equilibria. A welfare analysis is the topic of section 4. Finally, in section 5 we conclude. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
There are I agents in our economy (I ≥ 4) who are located at equal distance from each other in an interval that we normalize to [0, 1], i.e. agent i, i = 1, . . . , I, is located at (i − 1)/(I − 1). With a slight abuse of notation by I we also denote the set of agents in our economy. There are 2 securities, one safe and one risky security. The safe security gives a certain return of R while the risky security There are two markets where assets can be traded. Market 1 is located at 0 and market 2 is located at 1. When trading on market k (k = 1, 2) agent i determines her demand θ i (q) for the risky asset such as to maximize a meanvariance utility function u, taking the price q of the risky asset as given (the price of the safe asset is normalized to 1). More specifically, agent i solves the following optimization problem
3 For a critical discussion see for example Bergin and Lipman (1996) .
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where γ > 0 is a measure of the agents' risk aversion, and E(·) and Var(·) denote expectation and variance, respectively.
Agents also have idiosyncratic preferences for the two markets which we model by a linear cost c > 0. I.e. trader i's disutility c(i, k) for trading on market k (k = 1, 2) is given by c times her distance to the market. Hence,
and we assume that agent i's preferences are separable in the linear cost.
The sequencing of events and actions in our model is the following (see Figure   1 ). Observe that the timing is such that agents have to choose a market before knowing their endowments. 
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investors who have to choose a market on behalf of customers whose endowments they do not know yet.
Moreover, we do not allow agents to simultaneously trade on both markets, in other words the traders cannot arbitrage between the markets. This imposes no restriction if, for example, the positions of the markets represent different maturity dates for futures contracts and the positions of the traders represent their most preferred maturity dates. In this case arbitrage between the markets is ruled out by physical restrictions and hence due to the disutility of trade they face agents will trade on one market only.
First we solve for an equilibrium on one of the asset markets.
Equilibrium on the Asset Market
Agent i's optimization problem (P i ) can be rewritten as
The first order condition which is necessary and sufficient for a solution θ
Let T be the set of agents trading on a market. Then, an equilibrium price
Hence, 
so that agent i's ex post utility after trading on the market is given bỹ
Agent i's ex ante utility (prior to knowing his endowment and the endowments of other agents) for trading on a market with a set of T agents is independent of i and given by
where we have used the fact that
If we define U 0 to be the utility from not trading on any of the two markets (i.e. trading on a market with |T | = 1), hence
Let T k be the set of agents trading on market k, k = 1, 2. Then, taking into account the idiosyncratic preferences, i's ex ante utility for trading on market k with a set of traders T k is given by
In the sequel we assume that the agents correctly anticipate the liquidity effect of the number of traders in a market in their ex ante utilities.
Equilibrium in the Economy
In our economy each trader has 3 options: she can trade on market 1 or on market 2 or she can stay at home and consume her endowments. In the following we will 7 study the set of Nash equilibria for the resulting strategic game. To this end we first formulate our economic model in game theoretic terms.
Let I be the set of players and let S i ≡ S = {0, 1, 2} be the strategy set for player i, where 0 means that player i does not trade and k means that player i trades on market k, k = 1, 2. For a strategy profile s ∈ i∈I S i let T k (s) = {i | s i = k} be the set of players trading on market k, k = 1, 2, at the strategy profile s. For any i ∈ I trader i's utility at the strategy profile s is given by
is a standard finite I person normal form game. In the following let the constant K be defined by
A strategy profile s is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for Γ if
hence if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
One immediately verifies that there always exists a trivial Nash equilibrium where there is no trade: If all traders expect everyone to stay at home, then
. . , s I ) we denote the strategy profile for trader i's opponents (with the obvious adjustment whenever i = 1 or i = I). 8 Observe that this definition of a Nash equilibrium assumes that agents correctly anticipate that by trading on a market they will increase the number of traders present on that market by one. In our view this assumption is consistent with assuming price-taking behavior on the asset market because it implies a much smaller complexity of reasoning than that required by a full strategic analysis of the asset market. Moreover, as I → ∞, a situation we will frequently evoke, the strategic impact of an individual agent becomes negligible in any case.
8 staying at home is indeed a best reply. We state this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 Let s i = 0 for all i ∈ I. Then s is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the no trade equilibrium is weak:
is also a best reply of trader 1 to s −1 . Similar for trader I. Next we verify that in equilibrium the set of agents trading on a market forms an interval. More precisely, we have the following result:
Lemma 2.2 If s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then there exist I 1 , I 2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I + 1},
In the following we will say that (I 1 , I 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if s as defined in (4) is a Nash equilibrium for Γ. We will see that the no trade equilibrium is not the only Nash equilibrium that can arise, but that there can be additional equilibria with trade on two markets (individualization) or on one market only (standardization). Since our aim is to study the trade off between liquidity considerations and costs we restrict our analysis to the set of costs for which standardization is strictly individually rational for all traders, i.e. from now on we will assume that
which implies that U (I) − c(i, k) > U 0 for all i ∈ I and k = 1, 2. Under this condition standardization is indeed a (strict) Nash equilibrium as we state in the following theorem. The proof is straightforward. in that case, the liquidity gain from standardization is small relative to its cost. In the next section we will show that an evolutionary equilibrium concept overcomes this indeterminacy at least for a large and robust range of parameter values.
An Evolutionary Approach
We now consider a dynamic version of the static economy analyzed in the last section. We restrict ourselves to the case where I is even and, as before, we limit our analysis to costs c < K(I − 1)/I. Consider the following strategy profiles. is a Nash equilibrium for c ≥ 4K(I − 1) I(I + 2) and it is strict if the inequality is strict. Hence, for all c < K(I − 1)/I there exists a strict Nash equilibrium and (apart from symmetry) it is unique unless c ∈ 4K(I − 1)
Assume now that there is a sequence of static economies which we index by t = 1, 2, . . ., i.e. the game Γ is played repeatedly and in each period t the agents have to decide on which market to trade. Since trade on the markets is anonymous there are no reputation effects and traders can base their decision on which market to trade only on the observation of the attendance at both markets 12 in previous periods. We assume that traders have to consume all they possess after each trading round so that there is no capital accumulation.
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Also, assets are short-lived, i.e. they exist only for one period and then are replaced by new ones with the same characteristics.
We will assume that traders, instead of having rational expectations about the participation at the two markets, behave adaptively and play a best reply to what they have observed in the past. They have a limited capacity to process information, or alternatively, gathering information about the previous attendance at the two markets is costly.
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Information about the number of traders at both markets is only available for the last m ≥ 1 periods and each trader can process the information of at most n ≤ m periods, where n ≥ 1. We may think of a trader asking around to find out about the attendance at the two markets in the past until he has reached his (intellectual) capacity for exploiting the information. Since differently from fictitious play, here the memory m is finite, the past is eventually forgotten and does not influence the traders' decision in the presence any more.
In this setting, we will then assume that traders occasionally make mistakes or experiment, i.e. with some small probability they do not choose a best reply given their information. The question we are going to answer then is which market structure is most likely to be observed in the long run if the error probability goes to zero. 
for all s i ∈ S i . It is important to note that if traders remember whether and on which market they traded in past periods, they in fact only need the information about the attendance at the two markets in the sampled periods for choosing their best reply. Thus, histories are anonymous in a very strong sense. Observe that we deviate from the standard definition of a best reply to a sample which requires traders to determine the empirical distribution of the other players' actions one by one and then play a best reply to the resulting mixed strategy profile. By contrast we require traders to play a best reply to the joint empirical distribution of the other players' actions in the sample. In this way the anonymity of trade is warranted which we believe is essential for the model to be as realistic as possible.
With these preparations we now define a Markov process on H as follows.
For h ∈ H and s i ∈ S i let p i (s i |h) be the probability that i chooses s i given the history h. We require that p i (·|h) is a best reply distribution, i.e. p i (s i |h) > 0 if and only if there exists a sample of size n from h to which s i is a best reply. Also we require that p i (·|h) is independent of the trading period t. Traders choose their best replies independently of each other, i.e. if s = (s i ) i∈I is the right-most element of h ∈ H, the probability of moving from h ∈ H to h ∈ H is given by
The process P 0 is called adaptive play with memory m and sample size n. Formally, we assume that the first m trading periods are randomly selected so that the sampling process starts in period t = m + 1.
Obviously, h is an absorbing state of P 0 if and only if it consists of a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium played m times in a row. Definition 3.1 A game Γ is weakly acyclic if from any strategy-profile s there exists a directed path in the best reply graph of Γ to some strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ.
The following theorem shows that our game Γ is weakly acyclic. For the convergence result it is crucial that sampling is sufficiently incomplete since this creates enough stochastic variability in order to prevent the process from 12 Observe that in order to verify Theorem 3.2 we can use the same proof as Young (1993) although our best reply dynamic is different (see the discussion following the definition of a best reply to a sample). This is true because the proof basically relies on agents playing a best reply to a sample with identical strategy profiles in which case the different notions of best replies to a sample obviously coincide.
getting stuck in cycles. The following example shows that for our game adaptive play may fail to converge, if the condition in Theorem 3.2 is not satisfied. In order to analyze whether in this case convergence to standardization or to individualization is most likely to be observed we now consider perturbations of the adaptive play process caused by the fact that traders do not always choose a best reply their information but occasionally make mistakes or experiment with nonoptimal strategies.
We assume that in each period there is a positive probability ε that trader i does not play a best reply to some sample of size n but randomly chooses a strategy from S i .
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Experimentation is independent across traders and independent of the time period t. By q i (s i |h) we denote the probability that i chooses s i ∈ S i 13 More generally, we could consider individual experimentation probabilities ελ i > 0, so that the ratios λ i /λ j denote the relative probability with which trader i experiments as compared to trader j. However, the exact specification of the experimentation probabilities does not influence the result as long as the individual experimentation probabilities converge to 0 with the same rate (see Bergin and Lipman (1996) ), so that we chose the most simple presentation.
given that i experiments and the history is h. We assume that q i (s i |h) > 0 for all s i ∈ S i and all h ∈ H and that s i ∈S i q i (s i |h) = 1. The perturbed process P ε is defined as follows. Let J ⊂ I be the set of players that experiments. Then, conditionally on the event that the traders in J experiment the transition probability for moving from h ∈ H to h ∈ H is
where s ∈ i∈I S i is the right-most element of h . Hence, the new transition probability for moving from h ∈ H to h ∈ H becomes
The process P ε is called adaptive play with memory m, sample size n, experimentation probability ε and experimentation distributions q i . The exact specification of the q i 's will not play a role in the following so there is no need to be more precise. The only thing that matters is that all mistakes are possible and that they are independent across traders.
The process P Hence, the stochastically stable states are those states that are most likely to be observed in the long run when the experimentation probability becomes small. In order to characterize the set of stochastically stable states we need some more definitions. A mistake in the transition h → h is a component s i of the right-most element s of h which is not a best reply by agent i to any The corollary shows that the adaptive play dynamics with errors will always select a strict Nash equilibrium, more precisely a convention, in the long run whenever sampling is sufficiently incomplete. Hence, in our case the evolutionary approach will lead to an equilibrium selection. ≥ max{r,r}, we find that the first tree has least resistance so that γ 1 = r +r. By symmetry we get that γ 2 = r +r. The three possible trees rooted at {h 3 } are depicted in Figure 5 . Again, the first tree has least resistance and therefore γ 3 = 2r.
sample of size n from h. For h, h ∈ H the resistance r(h, h ) is the total number of mistakes involved in the transition h → h if h is a successor of h, otherwise
We conclude that h 1 and h 2 , i.e. the conventions corresponding to standardization where everyone goes to the same market, are stochastically stable if and only ifr ≤ r. Similarly, h 3 , i.e. the convention corresponding to the equilibrium where the first half of the agents trades on market 1 and the second half trades on market 2, is stochastically stable if and only ifr ≥ r. Hence, we now turn to the comparison of r andr. It turns out that in order to determine which resistance is larger it is not necessary to explicitly compute r andr.
For 0 ≤ F ≤ I lets F ∈ i∈I S i be given bys 
Hence,
Similarly, defineF to be the minimal F ≥ 1 such that s i = 1 is a best reply to s
15 By x we denote the smallest integer larger or equal to x ∈ R.
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We observe that F * ,F ≥ 2.
Assume that the economy is in state h 2 . Any path from h 2 to h 3 has to reach a state h such that if s is one of the n right-most elements of h then there exists
, with s i = 1 for all i ≤ F and s i = 2 for all i ≥ I/2 + 1.
16
Then, starting from h the adaptive play process can reach h 3 without any further mistakes, i.e. there exists a path from h to h 3 such that the sum of the resistances of all edges reached along the path is zero as we show in the following lemma. Hence r, the minimum resistance over all paths from h 2 to h 3 , can be characterized as the minimum total number of mistakes such that, starting from h 2 the adaptive play process reaches a state h with the property as in the statement of Lemma 3.6. Therefore, r is non-decreasing in F * . We will now construct such a path and determine its resistance. This will give an upper bound on r. to h n and hence from h 2 to h 3 by Lemma 3.6 is less than or equal to nF * . Since, starting from h 2 , one obviously needs at least F * mistakes for h 3 to be reached we conclude that for the minimum resistance r of a path from h 2 to h 3 it is true 16 For example, h 3 itself has this property.
that
Analogously,r can be characterized as the minimum number of mistakes such that, starting from h 3 , the adaptive play process reaches a state h with the following property: if s is one of the n right-most elements of h, then there exists Obviously,r is non-decreasing inF and we can derive the following bounds:
With these preparations we get the following result. This result is again very intuitive. If traders become more risk averse or if the variances of dividends or endowments increase, then liquidity considerations become more important relative to idiosyncratic preferences. Hence we expect the range of costs for which we observe standardization to become larger.
17 Observe that we cannot fix both n and m and let I → ∞ since L depends on I. From the proof of Theorem 3.1 it follows that L ≤ 2I, i.e. L increases with I at most linearly. 18 Recall from the proof of Theorem 3.8 that the coexistence here is due to the fact that the resistances r andr are step functions in c since there is a discrete number of traders.
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Welfare Analysis
In this section we briefly analyze our economy from a welfare theoretic point of view. We again restrict to the case where c < K(I − 1)/I. Obviously, the Nash equilibria of the game cannot be Pareto ranked since there is always an agent who strictly gains and another one who strictly looses when switching from one equilibrium to another. However, we can analyze which market structure would be chosen by a social planner who aims at maximizing a purely utilitarian social welfare function
is a utility profile. Observe that it is justified to add up the utilities of all traders in order to determine the welfare maximum since utility is transferable due to the additive separability of costs. Since any utility profile corresponds to a particular strategy profile chosen by the agents we can rewrite the planner's problem as
It is immediate to see that a necessary condition forŝ to be a maximizer of W is that the set of agents trading on the same market forms an interval and that there exists F, 0 ≤ F ≤ I, such thatŝ =s F , where we recall thats 
A straightforward computation shows that independently of c < K(I − 1)/I the maximum is achieved forF = I/2 if I is even andF = (I − 1)/2 orF = (I + 1)/2 if I is odd. Hence, if I is even, then
and if I is odd, then
Therefore, ifŝ is the welfare maximizing strategy profile, then Thus, for small c the market structure resulting in trade only on one market is welfare maximizing while for c large the market structure resulting from trade on both markets is welfare maximizing. Observe that the welfare maximizing strategy profile is always a Nash equilibrium of the game for the range of costs we are considering but the converse is obviously false.
where L(s) is the length of the shortest directed path in the best reply graph from the strategy profile s to some strict Nash equilibrium. As we already noted before, the constant L depends on I. Hence we write L(I) in the statement of the following result which immediately follows from Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 3.9. Hence, if I is large, the evolutionary process selects the social optimum in which there is trade on both markets and both markets have the same size.
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Conclusion
We have studied the evolutionary choice of markets in the presence of trading frictions and liquidity effects. It was shown, that except possibly for some interval of costs there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium which depends on the (exogenous) parameter values of the economy. In particular, for sufficiently low costs, all agents will meet in one market (most of the times), while for sufficiently high costs, there will be trade on both markets (most of the times). Hence we observe standardization (e.g. of maturity dates or trading platforms) if and only if liquidity considerations are relatively more important than idiosyncratic preferences for the two markets. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in economies with a large number of traders we will observe individualization rather than standardization. This is an intuitive result since the positive liquidity effect is small when two large markets are merged while the costs involved are relatively high.
Interestingly, though, the Nash equilibrium concept does not give us this result:
The range of costs for which both types of Nash equilibria coexist increases with the number of traders. In contrast the evolutionary analysis shows that the equilibria with trade solely on one market are not stable if the number of traders is large.
Further research in this area could follow several routes. On the one hand, the static model which forms the basis of our analysis has been deliberately kept as simple as possible. Obviously, it would be interesting to check the robustness of our results if these simplifications were relaxed. On the other hand, the question of the evolutionary choice of markets could be studied using evolutionary dynamics different from the ones investigated here.
A Appendix: Proofs Proof of Lemma 2.2: Let s be a Nash equilibrium. If T 1 (s) = ∅ let I 1 = 0.
Otherwise, let I 1 be the maximal i such that i ∈ T 1 (s) and let 1 ≤ j < i. If
which is a contradiction since player i's participation constraint (1) is violated.
Now assume that j ∈ T 2 (s). Then from (2) it follows that
Since i ∈ T 1 (s) from (2) it follows that
Since c(j, 2) − c(j, 1) > c(i, 2) − c(i, 1) from (7) and (8) we conclude that 
Without loss of generality let F ≤ I/2.
Then all Nash equilibria except for the no trade equilibrium are strict. In particular, ifs F is a Nash equilibrium then it is strict. Hence, ifs 
